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RECONSIDERING PAROLE RELEASE
DECISIONS IN ILLINOIS: FACTS,
MYTHS AND THE NEED FOR
POLICY CHANGESt
THOMAS PETERs* AND DAVID

NoRRIS**

INTRODUCTION

In 1989, the prison population in Illinois grew at a faster rate

than the prison population of any other state in the country.1
Nearly 29,000 inmates are now confined m Illinois prisons, an increase of over thirty-five percent since the end of 1988.2 Most of
these inmates eventually will be released.3 Once released, many
will be charged with new crimnal offenses and will return to jail or
4
prison.
Given the likelihood of release and the potential for future
criminal behavior, it is important to know when and why convicted
felons are released on parole or on mandatory supervised release.
Little, however, is known about the mechamcs of these release decisions or the efficacy of parole or mandatory supervised release in
t This is the first of two articles concerning some of the major forces
affecting Illinois' prison overcrowding problem. This article addresses inmate
release decisions and policy; the second article examines mandatory sentencing
and its accompanying social costs.
* B.S., MacMurray College, 1970; J.D., John Marshall Law School, 1975.
** B.A., Indiana University, 1981; J.D., John Marshall Law School, January, 1992.
1. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, MIDYEAR RELEASE (October 1990). See also STATE OF ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1990

(Apr. 1991) (Director of Illinois Department of Corrections, Howard A. Peters
III, states "[today, the prisons are holding over 4800 inmates more than the
rated capacity. Prison population projections indicate that this situation will
worsen if nothing changes.") [hereinafter STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1990].
2. See Culloton, Pnson Chief Says State Must Revamp Sentencing, Clicago Tribune, May 16, 1991, at 2, col. 1; UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1989 2 (1990).
3. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, TRANSITION PAPER 28 (Nov. 1,

1990) ("Over 97% of the inmates sentenced to prison will eventually be released
to their community.") [hereinafter TRANSITION PAPER].
4. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 28 (44% of all released inmates will
be returned to prison within three years of release); see also STATE OF ILLINOIS,
PRISONER REVIEW BOARD, 12TH ANNUAL REPORT, 1989 8, 9 (1990); UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CORRECTIONS REPORTING PROGRAM, 1985 4 (rev. 1990) (according to a national study, approximately 30% of
the parolees violated their parole terms).
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Illinois. Theory does not match or even closely parallel reality. Instead, policy is based on unsubstantiated hunches, political concerns, and gut feelings, without reference to research studies and
with little concern for the likely consequences.
The goal of this article is to describe and contrast the parole
and mandatory release systems in Illinois, to ask a few relevant
questions, and to propose some potential solutions. This article begins with a description of the parole release decision under indeterinmate sentencing. Next, the statutory rules governing the parole
release process and the practices of the Prisoner Review Board
("Board") are outlined. Then, focus is shifted to the practical effects of the Board's ad hoc decision-making with particular emphasis on the lack of a meaningful data base for parole release
decisions. Some of the myths which the Board has traditionally relied on are discussed and criticized.
This article then turns to mandatory supervised release, the politically popular, tough on crime approach which has dominated the
scene for the past decade. Mandatory supervised release is contrasted with parole, and the overcrowding problem which plagues
Illinois is identified as a foreseeable consequence of determinate
sentencing. Some of the fiscal problems of determinate sentencing
also are examined.
Finally, this article examines the supervision of released inmates under each system. Since the terms of release are the same,
parole supervision and mandatory supervised release supervision
are discussed together. The article notes the dual role the supervising agent must play and the conflict of interest it often creates. Of
greater inportance, this article cites the lack of significant contact
between the released inmate and the supervising agent as grounds
to question whether any form of supervised release can accomplish
the stated purpose of supervised early release. The authors conclude that abolishing all forms of post-incarceration supervision, or
identifying the most significant recidivism risks and closely supervising these individuals, may serve the public better.
PAROLE V MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE PROBLEM

Parole is a form of early release from a felony penitentiary sentence, designed, in theory, to reintegrate the prisoner into society
while closely supervising him.5 Parole originated more than a cen5. Greenholtz v. Nebraska State Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); Mornssey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1972); see generallyS. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECrION 620-22 (2d ed. 1973); Kastenmeir & Eglit, ParoleReleaseDectswon-Makzng: Rehabilitation,Expertise and the Demise of Mythology, 22 AM.
U.L. REV. 477 (1973).
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tury ago6 and in "the past 60 years... has become an integral part
' 7
of the penological system.
In Illinois, parole applies to those inmates who are serving indeterminate sentences.8 These inmates receive parole hearings after they have served the minimum term of their sentence and, if
paroled, they must serve the balance of their sentence under the
supervision and control of the parole authorities. 9'
Mandatory supervised release replaced parole in 1978 when Illinois switched from indeterminate sentences to determinate
sentences. 10 Although the conditions of mandatory supervised release are the same as for parole, mandatory supervised release differs significantly in other respects. Parole release hearings are not
held for inmates with determinate sentences because the structure
itself establishes release. The length of supervised release is set
when the court imposes sentence.'" An inmate with a determinate
sentence can expect release when he has served one half of his
fixed term sentence.
The difference between a release date established when sentence is imposed (the determinate sentence release date) and one
set at the discretion of the Board is significant. Parole, properly
used, can reward good conduct and penalize institutional violations,
thereby assistmg prison administrators in their efforts to control inmate behavior. 12 As a method of reducing prison overcrowding, parole can be used to advance the release of inmates, some of whom
could be safely supervised on the street at a greatly reduced cost to
the taxpayer.' 3 In these respects, parole is more- useful than
mandatory supervised release. The determinate sentence, by its nature, is of little use in controlling inmate behavior within the prison
6. See generally D. DREssLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND

PAROLE (1951) (discussing the early history of parole); see generally L. FRIEDmAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 594-605 (discussing the history of probation
and parole in the United States).
7. Note, Parole Revocation %n the Federal System, 56 GEo. L.J. 705
(1968)(as cited in Morrissey, 407 U.S. at 477).
8. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-3 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38, para1003-3-2.1 (1990).
9. Tiller v. Klincar, 138 IMI. 2d 1, 561 N.E.2d 576 (1990); Faheem-El v. Kilncar, 123 IM.2d 291, 527 N.E.2d 307 (1988).
10. Amendatory Act of 1977, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003 et. seq. (1978).
11. See znfra notes 95-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of supervised release for imates with determinate sentences.
12. N. MORRIs, THE FUTURE OF IMPmSONMENT 49-50 (1974); Fields, Illinois
Paroleand PardonBoardAdult ParoleDecisions, 62 ILL. B.J. 20, 20-23 (1973).
See generally D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF 301-03 (1975); STATE OF

NEw YORK,THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEw YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTIcA (1972) (hereinafter "ATTICA REPORT").

13. TRANSITION PAPER, supranote 3, at 25; Casper, DeterminateSentencing
and Prison Crowdingin Illinois, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 231,.232-236.
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and exacerbates a prison's overcrowding problem. 14
With the "war on drugs" threatening the implosion of the crimmal justice system,1 5 it is imperative to decide what role, if any, parole and mandatory supervised release should play in the criminal
justice system. It is easy to be tough on crime until the bills are due.
But inevitably the bills must be paid, and the cost of incarceration is
high and going higher. In 1989, it cost taxpayers $16,326 per inmate
in the adult division of the Illinois Department of Corrections, an
increase of $868 per inmate since 1985.16 In contrast, supervision of
released inmates, including the cost of electronic monitoring, costs
about $9500 annually per mmate.'1 The savings amounts to almost
five million dollars a year for every five hundred inmates who are
released to field supervisio i.' 8
Illinois has built a dozen new prisons m the last fourteen years,
has requested money for thirteen more, and may need to spend an
additional 755 million dollars by 1996, just to keep up with current
prison population growth. 19 Still, overcrowding is pressing the limits of the system. Each day courts, jails and prisons are being overwhelmed with new cases, new arrestees and new prisoners.20 As of
June 1990, Illinois prisons were forty-four percent above the capacity they were built to handle,21 and the "Illinois prison system is
more crowded today than at any point in the history of the
14. Harris, PrisonOvercrowding- The Time for Policy ChangeHas Come,
18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.489 (1991).
15. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 3 (report concludes that, "[t]he
dominant factor in the increase in admissions to the Department is, without
question, the rapidly growing number of drug law offenders being sent to the
State prison system
"); STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1990, supra note 1, at 1
(Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Howard Peters I states
that "[m]amly because of drug offenders, the prison population increased by
over 11% in calendar year 1990."). See also Chapman, In the Drug War,Bigger
Sentences for Smaller Crimes, Chicago Tribune, June 9, 1991, at 3, col. 1 (drug
offenders now constitute 43% of the federal inmate population and this figure is
projected to rise to 70% by 1995); see generally War on Drugs StrainingJails,
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
16. ILLiNOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1989 ANNUAL RE-

PORT 35 (1989); see also Karwath, Taxpayers Foot the Bill for Packed Prisons,
Chicago Tribune, Apr. 2, 1991, at 1, col. 3 (article contains chart listing annual
cost per inmate for each Illinois correctional institution for fiscal year 1990).
17. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 25.
18. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 25.
19. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 7. See also Karwath, State No. 1 in
Increaseof Inmates, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 3,1990, at 8, col. 1 (quoting Kenneth
Mcginnis, then Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections).
20. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 3-8. See also Blumstem, Planning
For Future Prison Needs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 207, 207-212; See generally
Karwath, State Prison Crunch Spurs Talk of Lighter Sentences, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 3, 1991, at 1, col. 5 (discussing effect of mandatory sentencing on overcrowded Illinois prison system).
21. Karwath, State's New Policy Lets Parolees Skip Check-ins, Chicago
Tribune, June 11, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
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system." 22

In these respects some form of early release from felony prison
sentences may be a financial necessity. Because it costs significantly less than incarceration, field supervision may take on added
importance in an effort to continue high conviction rates while trying to control costs. 23 But many fundamental questions about the
efficacy of supervised release are seldom asked, let alone answered.
Little is known about how the release decision is made in Illinois,
what factors are predictors of success or failure, or whether supervision helps the released inmate adjust to his newly acquired freedom
while adequately protecting society.
Most of the important release decisions are, at best, informed
hunches and, at worst, misguided prejudices. Information abounds,
but meaningful statistics are not kept. Though supervision is an integral part of the supervised release theory, in practice it is almost
totally absent. 24 Illinois' prisons are overcrowded, dangerous, and
extremely expensive. Parole agents are overworked and underpaid
and their caseloads are such that supervision is virtually nonexistent even for the most violent offenders. 25 Itis long past tine for
action but few of the relevant players understand the system or the
problems, and fewer still are willing to take steps to correct those
problems. This article frames some of the relevant questions and
identifies potential solutions.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCING AND PAROLE
Under the traditional indeterminate sentence, a convicted felon
received a sentence with a minmum and a maximum range, ten to
twenty years, for example.26 Within this range, the mnimum sen22.

TRANSITIoN PAPER,

supra note 3, at 3.

23. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 24-25;
24. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 28-30.
25. See Recktenwald & Karwath, ParoleSystem a Bad Joke that May Get
Worse, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 7, 1991, at 1, col. 5 (currently Illinois parole officers monitor an average of 140 parolees each, which may soon increase to 800
parolees per parole officer due to budget cuts; national corrections experts say a
manageable caseload is 45).
26. See People v. Wall, 3 Ill.
2d 11, 119 N.E.2d 780 (1954); People v. Tice, 89
Ill. App. 2d 313, 231 N.E.2d 607 (1967); People v. McKinney, 40 Ill. 2d 372, 240
N.E.2d 577 (1968).
Indeterminate sentencing was originally based on the theory that the sentencmg judge could not determine, at the time of imposing sentence, when a
criminal would be "cured." Friedman, supra note 6, at 597. Since a criminal
should be incarcerated only "as long as he is 'uiifit to be free,' "the judge would
leave that determination to the prison officials who viewed the prisoner every
day. Id. Thus, under this theory, a prisoner carried "the key of his prison m his
own pocket." Id.
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tence determined parole eligibility. 27 Good time credits were
earned based on time served and meritorious behavior.2s When the
prisoner had served the minimum sentence, which was determined
by adding tine actually served to earned good time credits, he was
eligible for parole.29 From that time on the inmate had parole release hearings at least once every year. 30
For most prisoners these hearings were a source of hope. Even
those with minimum sentences m excess of twenty years knew that
parole hearings were mandatory after serving eleven years and
three months.31
Thus, with indeterminate sentencing, parole was a reward used
to encourage inmates to follow prison rules, because the inmates
knew parole board members scrutinized their prison records. 32 As
a former Chairman of the Board explained, "there is no doubt that
a man's attitude, conduct, and self improvement while in the institution are of great importance, and a man who does well is going to
be paroled sooner than one who does not become involved in the
programs that are available at the institution. '33 Anticipation of release was a strong motivation for prisoners to conform with prison
regulations and to participate in educational and vocational
4
programs.3
Determinate sentences, with fixed release dates and longer
terms of imprisonment, are not as useful in controlling inmate behavior as the annual parole hearing. Since the change to determinate sentences, inmates have killed eight Department of
Corrections employees and "many [Department employees] have
been seriously mjured." ' 5 Inmate-on-inmate violence also has increased in recent years with at least thirty inmates killed and scores
more injured.36 Of course, the violence within Illinois prisons can27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-3 (1977); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para.

1005-8-1(d) (1978).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-2.1 (1977).

29. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-3 (1977).

30. Tiller v. Klincar, 138 IMl. 2d 1, 6, 561 N.E.2d 576, 578 (1990); ILL REv.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-5(f) (1988).

31. Merritt, Due Process in Parole Granting:A CurrentAssessment, 10 J.
MARSHALL J. PRAc. & PRoc. 93-95 (1976); Fields, supra note 12, at 22; ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-3(a) (1978).
32. Fields, supra note 12, at 20-21; Merritt, supra note 31, at 93 para. 1 n.4
(and cases cited thereto).
33. Fields, supra note 12, at 21.
34. Morris, supra note 12, at 32-40; Merritt, supra note 31, at 93 n.4.
35. TRANSiON PAPER, supra note 3, at 4.
36. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 4. See also Smith, State's Prsons

Test the Limits - Potentialfor Trouble Grows, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 31, 1991,
at 1, col. 5 (lists the following reported attacks by inmates at the four maximum-security Illinois prisons in 1990: (1) Pontiac, population 1924; 257 attacks
on inmates, 331 attacks on staff; (2) Joliet, population 1350; 62 attacks on in-
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not be attributed solely to the change in sentencing procedures.
But indeterminate sentencing, with its hope of early release, undoubtedly played a significant role m controlling inmate behavior.
PAROLE RELEASE HEARINGS: THE STATUTORY GUIDELINES

Inmates have very few rights at parole release hearings 3 7 Parole is not itself a right,3 s and does not necessarily, trigger a constitutionally protected liberty interest.3 9 In fact, parole could be
abolished without offending any constitutional standards, so
whatever rights parolees have at these hearings are statutory
creations. 40
By statute, Illinois requires a release hearing at least thirty
days before the inmate first becomes eligible for parole.41 The inmate must submit a plan which outlines where he will be living,
with whom, and what his employment opportunities are.42 If he
needs assistance in preparing his plan or obtaining relevant documents, Department of Corrections personnel are obligated to assist
hin.

43

In addition to the parole plan, the Board also may consider the
inmate's institutional record as it has access to the inmate's master
record file.44 The Board is required to consider records relating to
the inmate's conviction, any material or testimony submitted by the
State's Attorney or by the victim, any reports offered by the warden, available medical and psychological reports, the statements of
the inmate concerning his parole plans, his institutional record, and
45
any relevant documents or witnesses he has to offer.
The release hearing is informal and nonadversaral. 46 Neither
the right to counsel nor the right to confront and cross-examine
mates, 171 attacks on staff; (3) Menard, population 2565; 81 attacks on inmates,
166 attacks on staff; and (4) Stateville, population 2118; 24 attacks on inmates, 62
attacks on staff).
37. Greenholtz v. Nebraska State Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1979).
38. People v. Hawkins, 54 Ill.2d 247, 296 N.E.2d 725 (1973); People v. Spivey,
10 Ill.2d 586, 141 N.E.2d 321 (1957); People v. Ragen, 400 Ill. 191, 79 N.E.2d 479
(1948); People v. Nowak, 387 IMI. 11, 55 N.E.2d 63 (1944).
39. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987) (parole statute creates a
constitutionally protected liberty interest only where the statutory language is
mandatory); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12; see generally Merritt, supra note 31.
40. Heirens v. Mizell, 729 F.2d 449, 457-58, 460 (7th Cir. 1984).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-4(a) (1990).
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-4(b) (1990).
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, -para. 1003-3-4 (1990).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-4(c) (1990).
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-4(d) (1990).

46. Tiller v. Kincar, 138 Ill. 2d 1, 13-18, 561 N.E.2d 576, 581-83 (1990);
Heirens v. Mizell, 729 F.2d 449, 466 (7th Cir. 1984); Merritt, supra note 31, at 98102.
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witnesses apply at the release hearing. 47 However, the Board usually allows private counsel the opportunity to present witnesses and
to argue the parolee's case. At least one member of the Board is
present for the hearing, although the decision must be reached by a
panel of three or more.4 s A report of the hearing must be prepared
49
so absent Board members have a basis for casting their votes.
Parole must be denied if the Board determines that (a) there is
a substantial risk that the parolee will not conform to the parole
conditions; (b) release would deprecate the seriousness of the offense; or (c) release would have a substantially adverse effect on
5
institutional discipline.W
Youthful offenders, who have been committed under the Juvenile Court Act, must be released on or before
their twentieth birthday. Adult offenders, who have served the
maximum term of their sentence, must be released.5 1 All others
who come before the Board for a release hearing are parolable at
the Board's discretion.52 The Board is required to render a decision
within a reasonable time after the hearing. 53 It is also obligated to
state the reasons for its decision in the record and in a notice of its
4
decision, which is given to the inmateThe Board has frequently been criticized for paying too little
attention to its reasons for denying parole.s5 Too often the Board
lumps vastly different inmates into the same category or treats sunilarly situated inmates differently. 56 Illinois' statutory parole guidelines contribute to this problem. These guidelines seemingly limit
the Board's options when it denies parole, to the three reasons cited
in the statute.57 Moreover, some Board members believe they can
avoid being sued if they base their decisions on canned statutory
reasons, rather than giving personalized reasons for denying parole. 58 This explanation, however, does not fully answer the criticism of the Board's lack of consistency because the Board members
are immune from damage actions, 59 and judicial review of their de47. Tiller, 138 Ill. 2d at 13-18, 561 N.E.2d at 581-83; Hetrens, 729 F.2d at 466.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-5 (1990).

49. ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 38, para. 1003-3-5 (1990).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-5(c) (1990).
51.

ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 38, paras. 1003-3-5(d),(e) (1990).

52. Tiller v. Klincar, 138 Ill. 2d 1, 15, 561 N.E.2d 576, 582 (1990); Heirens v.
Mizell, 729 F.2d 449, 463-66 (7th Cir. 1984).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-5(f) (1990).

54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-5(f) (1990).
55. See, e.g., Tiller, 138 Ill. 2d at 14, 561 N.E.2d at 580-81.
56. M. STURGIS, LET THE RECORD SHOW, MEMOIRS OF A PAROLE BOARD
MEMBER 25-26 (1978).

57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-5 (1990).
58. Sturgis, supra note 56, at 25, 56-57.
59. Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1182 (7th. Cir. 1984) (immunity from
cavil liability for parole board members m Illinoi); see also Gale v. Moore, 763
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cisions is extremely limited.60
Some inconsistency is inevitable, but it is also true that the
Board does not have a systematic approach to this complex and sensitive issue. Instead of release decisions based on data, research
findings, and personal observations, the Board too often relies on
the instincts of its members. Decision by hunch frequently carries
6
the day. 1
THE NEED FOR A DATA BASE
Given the importance of the parole release decision to society
and to the inmate seeking release, data must be kept and used to
help guide the Board's decision making process. What little data
are kept, however, are virtually meaningless, and the Board has
never maintained a system of precedents.
For example, the Board does not routinely record and correlate
information which could be used to identify parole success indicators. "In order to predict parole outcome we need reliable information which will help to separate the offenders with a high
probability of success on parole from those with a high probability
of failure."6 2 Yet the Board persists in ad hoc decision-making.
It is important to know what, if any, correlation exists between
success on parole and the parolee's family situation, his employment history, his age, his level of intelligence, the nature of the offense, his criminal history, his institutional record, and the number
of years he has been incarcerated. Twenty years ago the Illinois
Youth Commission gathered data on some of these factors, laying
the groundwork for future studies.63 Unfortunately, the last two
decades have not seen meaningful follow-up studies, and the Board
has not established a system for predicting success based on studies
of parole behavior. 64 Instead, the Board relies on assumptions it
makes about these and other factors and the gut feeling of individF.2d 341 (8th Cir.1985) (immunity from-civil liability for parole board members
outside Illinois).

60. See, e.g., Heirens v. Mizell, 729 F.2d 449, 467 (7th Cir. 1984) (court refused to review Parole board's decision).
61. Sturgis, supra note 56, at 23-28.
62. L. OHLIN, SELECTION FOR PAROLE, A MANUEL OF PAROLE PREDICTION
47 (1951); see also J. Rogers, Parole Prediction m Three Dimensions: Theory,
Prediction and Perception (1966) (unpublished manuscript available m Umversity of Chicago Library).
63. W KLIMEK & N. MCHUGH, RECIDIVISM AND REHABILITATION (1967).
See also P BIGMAN, DISCRETION, DETERMINATE SENTENCING AND THE ILLINOIS
PRISONER REVIEW BOARD: A SHOTGUN WEDDING (1979).
64. See D. GLASER, GROSS PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PAROLE OUTCOME (National Parole Institute 1964).
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ual Board members.as
Without questioning the good faith or knowledge of Board
members, this non-system invariably leads to random and inconsistent decisions. Differences in emotional, financial, and racial backgrounds cause Board members to see the same inmate quite
differently. In her memoir, Margie Sturgis, a former Board member, recalls a typical release hearing where the male board member
who was with her believed the inmate they interviewed was a poor
risk because he was hostile to authority figures. Mrs. Sturgis saw it
66
another way, "[h]e had sensed hostility, while I had sensed fear."
Whether either of them was right, no one knows. Nor did they
know whether hostility or fear were predictors of success or failure
on parole. Perceptions are bound to vary but there should be a
common base of information against which these perceptions can be
gauged. The Illinois Board is not guided by a shared bank of information and does not correlate data necessary to create a schedule of
success and failure predictors.
Most of the information needed to set up a system of analysis
based on the characteristics of successful parolees is already in the
Board's possession. The Board knows who is on parole. It knows
what crime the parolee committed, how old he was when he committed the offense and when he was released. It knows how far he
went in school, how he handled himself in prison, whether he was
employed before conviction, whether he has a job waiting for him
when he is released, and much more.
The Board need only begin comparing these and other factors
for those parolees who succeed with those who fail. Soon the Board
65. Sturgis, supra note 56, at 13, 36-37. One author cites the colloquy between parole board members and a hopeful inmate, from the motion picture
"Raising Arizona," to depict parole release hearings:
H.I. McDunna stood before the three-member panel of the Arizona State
Board of Pardons and Paroles. In this hearing, the Board would determine
whether to release H.I. ("Hi"), a three-time armed robber, once again.
First Member: They got a name for people like you, H Re-ci-di-vism.
Second Member: Re-peat o-ffender.
First member: Not a pretty name, is it, Hi?
Hi: No sir. That's one bonehead name, but that ain't me anymore.
Second Member: You're not just telling us what we want to hear?
Hi: No sir. No way.
First Member: 'Cause we just want to hear the truth.
Hi: Then I guess I am telling you what you want to hear.
Second Member: Boy, didn't we just tell you not to do that?
Hi: Yes sir.
Second Member: (approving parole) Okay, then
Note, A Board Does Not a Bench Make: Denying QuaszJudicualImmunity to
ParoleBoard Members in Section 1983 DamagesActions, 87 MICH. L. REV. 241
(1988).
66. Sturgis, supra note 56, at 13.
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will have a history of characteristics from which it can determine
whether an inmate's chance of successfully adjusting to parole can
be predicted. "By routine follow-up investigation of paroled cases
and by carrying on a continuous program of research on parole
problems, a predictor system can become one of the most effective
and reliable aids available to the parole board ... "67 This invaluable tool has gone unused too long in Illinois. In its place is a veritable hodge-podge of guesswork and presumptions, some probably
valid, others undoubtedly not.6
Careful evaluation of the data may prove that parole success
cannot be predicted. For example, parole release for indeterminate
sentence inmates is traditionally predicated on a good institutional
record and evidence of a viable parole plan. 69 But there is reason to
believe that a prisoner's institutional record has no bearing on the
likelihood of success after release from prison. 70 Empirical studies
have demonstrated that predictions of parole success are no more
accurate after years of observing the inmate's institutional behavior
than if made very early in the prison term.71 These studies do not
rule out the concept of parole success predictors, but they strongly
suggest that the traditional reliance on an inmate's institutional behavior is misplaced.
This conclusion, if verified, does not reduce the need for meaningful statistical and philosophical analysis of the role of parole supervision once an inmate is released. It is better to know that a
prisoner's institutional record is not an accurate indicator of an inmate's success on parole than to mistakenly assume it is. The current haphazard approach breeds contempt among inmates while
providing little protection to the public. 72 It is long past time for

the Board to gather usable data, establish parole predictors, if there
are any, and create an open schedule of precedents based on its parole release decisions.73 It is better to know that parole success cannot be predicated than to presume it can and then use false positives
67. Ohlin, supra note 62, at 86.
68. There is no reason for an Illinois Board member to lament that, "I could
not buy the idea of simply arriving at a decision based entirely on assumption
without supportive evidence
[a]fter reviewing some of the other members'
decisions, I wondered often if they had been furnished with a crystal ball which
I had not been privileged to receive." Sturgis, supra note 56, at 36-37.
69. Fields, supra note 12, at 20-21.
70. Morris, supra note 12, at 35.
71. R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 183-92 (World Umversity Library Series 1970).
72. Sturgis, supra note 56, at 25. See generally ATTICA REPORT, supra note
12.
73. If Board members "are found to be mcapable of performing their mtended function - the identification of prisoners ready for release - they will
be employed to achieve other ends." F ALLEN, DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL. PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE

84 (1981).
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as reasons for granting or denying release. No one benefits from
the delayed release of an inmate who can be safely and far less expensively monitored on the street, just as no one benefits from the
early release of an inmate based on misconceptions about his alleged rehabilitation.
Parole can be used to control an inmate's behavior even if it has
little or no residual effect once the inmate is released. The implementation of open and structured rewards, such as good time credits (which hasten the inmate's release date), encourages compliance
with prison rules. Parole can also be used as a means of controlling
the prison population. There is a point at which prison crowding
becomes so onerous, to the correctional staff which is put at risk,
and to the public which must pay the escalating costs of long term
incarceration, that releasing the least dangerous inmates makes
sense.
In the 1980's, Illinois had a de facto early release program for
three years and during that time approximately 10,000 inmates
were released before their legal outdate. 74 So far no one has studied the recidivism rate of these early releasees. But under similar
circumstances the rate of recidivism in Florida for early releasees
was less than the recidivism of the planned releasees. 75 The Florida
study suggests that Illinois should provide some mechanism by
which the Board, or some other appropriate agency, could release
inmates as a means of controlling the prison population.
Parole can serve a useful function if the limitations of the system are admitted and accounted for from the beginning. If rehabilitation cannot be accurately predicted, parole can still be used to
"reinforce institutional discipline", and to control an exploding
prison population.76 Meanwhile research must be renewed with the
aim of finding any factors which might predict success or failure on
parole. For example, employment throughout the first year of release seems to greatly reduce recidivism. 77 It may be possible to
identify other circumstances which influence the probability of success on parole, and it certainly is worth some time and money to
78
continue the search.
Once the Board has accomplished this, it will not be as difficult
to provide more precise statements of reasons when parole is demed. If research identifies predictors of parole success or failure,
74. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 3.
75. EICHMANN, IMPACT OF THE GIDEON DECISION UPON CRIME AND SENTENCING IN FLORIDA: A STUDY OF RECIDIVISM AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANGE

71-73 (1966).

76. Allen, supra note 73, at 84.
77. D. GLASER, CRIMINOLOGICAL PREDICTION 9-10 (1965).

78. Morris, supra note 12, at 31-34.
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those factors can be cited by the Board in support of its parole release decisions. In the event the data prove that success on parole
cannot be predicted, then the Board's decisions may be based on
other legitimate concerns - such as to alleviate overcrowding or to
79
reward good conduct.
USING REASONS TO CHECK DISCRETIONARY POWERS

Providing reasons is always a sound policy when dealing with
broad discretionary powers.8 0 Reasons help structure discretion,
and structured discretion improves the quality of justice.8 ' Reasons
help assure that the primary legal and factual issues are considered
and reduce the likelihood of careless or capricious decisions.8 2
No system, no matter how fair and open, is fool proof.83 Still,
as long as reasons are given, there is a better chance that, in most
cases, a system of structured discretion will be applied. In those
cases where the reasons given are disingenuous, review by a higher
administrative tribunal or by the courts may be the only answer.
The same principles hold true for a system of open precedents.
Consistency promotes justice and adds credibility to any system of
administrative discretion. 84 What is needed is a flexible approach:
less rigid than judicial precedent yet predictable enough that,
within categories of offenders and classes of crimes, consistency is
achieved.85 Discretion and a feel for the case must not be eliminated, but the release decision must be based on more than a Board
member's hunch, no matter how well trained that hunch may be.
In summary, once the salient data are obtained, correlated, and
interpreted, the Board should establish guidelines and precedents
based on parole success predictors or other valid concerns. These
guidelines should be published, although inmate names could be
withheld from any precedent setting cases.86 "It is an essential element of justice that the rules and processes for measuring parole
readiness be made known to the inmate."8 7 Society should be
spared the damage of preventable criminal behavior and scarce re79. Allen, supra note 73, at 83, 84.
80. K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 97-98
(1976).
81. Id. at 98.
82. Id. at 104.
83. '"hen administrators realize that their motivating reasons are unlikely
to win approval, they naturally do what they can to set forth reasons that will
look better." Id. at 105.
84. Davis, supra note 80, at 106-11.
85. Id. at 126-33.
86. Id.
87. PoRTER, CRITERIA FOR PAROLE SELECTION 227 (Proceedings of Amen-

can Correctional Association 1958).

The John Marhall Law Remew

[Vol. 24:815

sources must be used to maximize its protection. A system guided
by research, data, and personal experience is more likely to meet
these goals than the current practice which relies too heavily on the
intuition and personal prejudices of Board members.
If it turns out that parole success cannot be predicted, then the
Board should base its decisions on other legitimate concerns, such
as controlling Inmate behavior or reducing overcrowding. But no
purpose is served by continuing the present system, which is more
mystical than scientific, more gut reaction than informed
prediction.
That is not to say the Board will be infallible if it establishes a
more systematic approach - based on information rather than
speculation. Even with all the relevant data and a structured system of discretion, the Board has an unenviable task. There are
bound to be failures, and the successes will seldom be known, let
alone applauded. Parole decisions usually are more a tangle of mdnight shadows than a shining bright line. But thanklessness and uncertainty are not valid reasons to ignore important facts and the
trends those facts reveal. Society loses when an inmate is too long
in prison or too early on the streets. "It is, at least, less hazardous if
one separates facts from fancy when weighing what the available
information means."s
DETERMINATE SENTENCES AND PAROLE

During most of the 19th and the early part of the 20th century,
determinate sentencing was commonplace. However, with the hope
that prisoners could be rehabilitated, states shifted their sentencing
policy to indeterminate sentencing. But when recidivism rates
showed no signs of improvement, after "rehabilitation," many
states, including Illinois, returned to determinate sentencing.8 9
Liberals criticized indeterminate sentencing because disparity
was an almost unavoidable consequence. 9° Prisoners who committed the same offense and had similar criminal records often served
vastly different sentences.9 1 Release dates were largely a function
of institutional records,92 even though institutional records are not
indicators of success on parole. This led Marvin Frankel, a well
respected law professor and federal judge, to remark that, "the al88. O'Leary & Glaser, The Assessment of Risk zn ParoleDecision Making,

reprntedin THE FUTURE

OF

PAROLE 139 (1972).

89. See generally Morns, supra note 12, at 30; Aspen, New class X Sentencing Law: An Analyszs, 66 ILL. B. J. 344, 344-45 (1978).
90. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRUAiNAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7
(1963).
91. I&
92. Fields, supra note 12, at 20-21.
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most wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in
the fashioning of [indeterminate] sentences are terrifying and mtol93
erable for a society that professes a devotion to the rule of law."
Recidivism was not reduced by indeterminate sentencing. Conservatives viewed this as evidence that discretionary releases had to
be reduced. It was time to stop treating criminals with kid gloves
and get tough; prisoners should serve longer sentences and fewer
convicted felons should be placed on probation.9
By definition, a determinate sentence has no minimum or maximum length; it is for a specific term of years, ten or twenty years,
not ten to twenty years. 95 Parole, officially called mandatory supervised release under the determinate sentence law, is fixed by the
sentence itself.9 6 Once the sentence is served (day-for-day good time
credits ensure, with rare exceptions, that every prisoner will be released after serving one-half of his sentence) release is
mandatory. 97 Then a fixed period of supervision begms.98
While the change from the uncertainty of the indeterminate
sentence to the fixed release date of the determinate sentence had
the benefit of clarity, it may have caused more trouble than good.
In 1977 the Illinois prison population was 10,982; by the end of 1990
it exceeded 28,800. 99 Much of this increase is attributable to determinate sentencing, and there is no relief in sight from this alarming
trend.1 00 The most recent data indicate that the sharpest increases
93. Frankel, supra note 90, at 5.
94. November 1, 1987, the federal government implemented the federal
sentencing guidelines. These guidelines mandate determinate sentences within
an extremely narrow range and limit probation to a small number of offenses.
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GuIDE-

LINES 1, 213, 216-24 (1988).
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1977); Aspen, supra note 89, at
344-47. Anyone with a minimum sentence of twenty years or less when the
legislature changed from indeterminate to determinate sentences was given the
option of accepting a fixed release date or having periodic parole hearings. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-2.1(a) (1978). Those prisoners serving mdeterminate sentences with a minimum of greater than twenty years do not have that
option, but they continue to receive periodic parole release hearings. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-2.1(b) (1990).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para 1005-8-1(d)(1) (1987).
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-6-3(a)(2) (1977).
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(d) (1977).
99. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 3, 4; Karwath, supra note 21, at 1,
col. 1 (the current Illinois prison population is 28,806, 44% over designed
capacity).

100. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 3-5; 'STATISTICAL PRESENTATION
1990, supra note 1, at 2 ("This section [of the report] demonstrates how determinate sentencing contributes to the continuing increase in the prison population.
At the end of 1977 [when determinate sentencing began] the population was
10,982. The December 31, 1990 population was 27,516, an increase of over 150%
in the past 13 years.").
The only prisoners who have parole hearings now are those who were serving lengthy indeterminate sentences in 1978 when the determinate sentencing
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in the prison population have occurred in the last few years.' 0 '

As the prison population increases, more prisons, more guards,
and more money are needed. The 1991 fiscal budget for the Department of Corrections is 596 million dollars.' 0 2 Although politically
popular, the tough on crime motivation for determinate sentences
carries a heavy financial burden. Studies indicate that the cost of
incarceration can run as much as twenty tunes more than the cost
of probation or parole supervision.' 0 3 In Illinois, the cost of incarceration is almost double the cost of field supervision, even when
i 4
electronic monitoring is included in the cost of field supervision.'
Moreover, rapid expansion of prison facilities is extremely
costly and cannot keep pace with the influx of new determinate
sentence inmates.' 0 5 "Court admissions, which had averaged 5%
growth annually over the last ten years, grew by 11% in FY [fiscal
year] 89 and by 32% in FY 90. ' 106 Built in 1981, the relatively new
Centralia Correctional Center's sewer system cannot accommodate
the current inmate population. The Centralia prison population exceeds its design limit by 450 inmates. 0 7 This might seem like a trivial matter for those whose immediate response is "who cares-let
the inmates suffer the mconvemence." But the real world cost is a
dramatic increase in the Department's sewage and water bills.'0 8
Packed prisons also recently led to a $331,000 expenditure for locks
at two medium security prisons which had not expected to replace
locks for another ten years. i0 9 According to Department of Corrections' reports, without major new construction or a change in admissions policy "the bed shortfall will grow to catastrophic
proportions
"110 Yet "in terms of cost, it would appear extremely difficult for the State to build its way out of the projected
law took effect. Tiller v. Klincar, 138 IM.2d 1, 6-7, 561 N.E.2d 576, 578 (1990).
Although m 1990 more than twenty-seven thousand inmates were serving felony prison sentences in Illinois, there were less than a hundred parole release
hearings. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 3, 28. As time passes fewer parole
release hearings will be held because the number of indeterminate sentence
inmates remaining in prison dwindles each year. STATISTICAL PRESENTATION
1990, supra, note 1, at 8 (Table 5). Fifty-two indeterminate sentence inmates
were released in 1990. Id. at 3.
101. STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1990, supra note 1, at 2-3, 36.
102. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 1.
103. N. SINGER & V WRIGHT, COST-ANALYSIS OF CoRRECTIONAL STANDARDS,
INSTITUTIONAL BASED PROGRAMS AND PAROLE 68

(1976).

104. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 25.
105. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 2.
106. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 3.
107. State Sees OvercrowdingPush Przsons to Lzmit, Chicago Tribune, May
1, 1990, at 6, col. 5.
108. See, Karwath, Taxpayer's Foot the Bill for Packed Prisons, Chicago
Tribune, Apr. 2, 1991, at 1, col. 3.
109. Karwath, supra note 108, at 1, col. 3.
110. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 7.
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overcrowding problem."'1'
Determinate sentences are also a disincentive for many prisoners who might otherwise participate in educational or therapy related programs. Previously, an inmate was encouraged to
participate in "rehabilitation" programs, if for no other reason than
it looked good when he appeared for his parole release hearng.112
Even though this participation usually did not lead to rehabilitation,
it was an effective way of controlling inmate behavior within the
prison. There is no fast track for release with determinate sentencing. As a result, it does not matter whether one tries to get a high
school diploma or learn a trade, release comes to all determinate
sentence inmates on exactly the same schedule.
At the same time, hope is obliterated for many. Why should an
undereducated 25 year old man serving a sixty year determinate
sentence see reason to abide by prison rules or "rehabilitate" himself. He knows that he cannot be released until he has served thirty
years. If he had no job, little money, and a broken family when he
came in at age 25, why should he believe things will be better thirty
years later 9 And how are prison administrators to deal with him in
the meantime? These questions are not answered by determinate
by those
sentencing and probably were not carefully considered
113
package.
control"
"crime
a
as
it
for
who pushed
Today, Illinois' maximum security prisons are so overcrowded
that they have been described as a "predator's paradise dominated
."114 There were 257 inmate attacks on inmates and
by gangs..
331 inmate attacks on correctional staff at the Pontiac Correctional
Center in 1990, and the State paid more than $500,000 dollars in
workers' compensation claims as a result of this inmate violence." 5
The umon president for the Menard correctional staff noted that,
"[i]nmates with long sentences are always causing us problems because we have nothing to hold over their heads if they cause
trouble."' " 6 His counterpart at the Pontiac Correctional Center recently complained that, "there is no control at Pontiac, the inmates
have more control over the institution than the staff."117
111. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 1.
112. Fields, supra note 12, at 20-23; Sturgis, supra note 56, at 21-22.
113. Casper, supra note 13, at 237.

114. Smith, supra note 36, at 1.
115. I&
116. Id. at 13.
117. Id. Although the statistics on prison violence for 1991 are not yet available, the situation appears to be worsening. The union representing prison
guards and other prison workers recently requested Governor Edgar to set up

an emergency panel to deal with prison violence. Merrifield, Guard Union
Callsfor PrsonSummit, Chicago Tribune, July 23,1991, at 5, col. 5. On July 22,

1991, Steve Cullen, executive director of Council 31 of the American Federation
of State County and Mumcpal Employees which represents 10,000 prison work-
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To a great degree the burgeoning prison population and the
concomitant problems of controlling a larger number of inmates,
with no realistic hope of release, are the direct result of mandatory
sentencing laws. When Governor Thompson signed the determinate sentence law, wich he called Class X, he conceded that it was
unlikely to reduce crime much, if at all.11 8 Those familiar with the
legislation knew that it drew its political appeal from the harsher
sentences it required for violent crimes and repeat offenders. 119
They also knew that it was likely to result in prison overcrowding
and that it would not promote rehabilitation. 120 Now even former
Governor Thompson, one of the chief proponents of determinate
sentencing, admits that determinate sentencing has contributed
greatly to prison overcrowding. 121
RELEASE DECISIONS UNDER DETERMINATE SENTENCING LAws

Most of the convicted felons presently incarcerated in Illinois
prisons will be released simply because they have served one-half of
their fixed term sentence. Even for these determinate sentence inmates, it is important to identify those who are most likely to violate the conditions of their mandatory supervised release.122 By
identifying high risk releasees, scarce resources can be used to more
effectively monitor this group.
Nothing about the determinate sentence process suggests that
it is a better predictor of success than the more traditional parole
release hearings. At least with indeterminate sentences, parole
plans were taken into account by the Board before parole was authorized. With determinate sentences a judge, based on skimpy
ers, requested that a panel composed of several interest groups be set up to
consider certain "stopgap measures" to help protect prison workers. 1d. The
request was in response to a statewide lockdown of all maximum security prisons caused by the stabbing of two guards and the taking of several guards as
hostages. Id. The union leader stated that "[w]hile we believe these steps will
help improve security, we are certain that they will not resolve the underlying
problem in the Illinois prison system - severe overcrowding." Id.
118. Chicago Daily L. Bull., Dec. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 7 (U.P.I. dispatch).
119. Aspen, supra note 89, at 347.
120. Id. at 351.
121. Thompson, Introduction:Illinos' Response To Prison Overcrowding,
1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 203-06. The Illinois General Assembly recently sent a plan
to Governor Jim Edgar to reexamine the state's mandatory sentencing structure. Ramsey, Lawmakers Take Middle Road on Crime as Prisons Overflow,
Chicago Daily L. Bull., July 22, 1991, at 1, col. 1. The plan would create a 24member panel of various groups to make recommendations on possible changes
in mandatory sentencing, including returning more discretion to the sentencing
judge. Id.
122. "For example, a man who falls in a group having only one chance in
twenty of violating
obviously requires less supervision than one whose
chances are fifteen out of twenty." Ohlin, supra note 62, at 12-13.
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pre-sentence evaluations, is expected to accurately predict behavior
patterns ten, twenty, or more years down the road.
It is unrealistic to believe judges are prescient to the degree
Trial judges
assumed by the determinate sentencing procedure.
rely on presentence investigation reports. These reports are not
prepared by professionally trained staff with diagnostic skills, and
their
the court personnel who prepare the reports do not "observe
4
subjects long enough to be able to make diagnoses."'2
A typical presentence report in Cook County, for example, contams little more than the biographical information provided by the
defendant. The person preparing the report does not conduct an
outside investigation verifying this information. If the defendant
says he does not use drugs, his answer is seldom checked with family members or others who might know the truth.m
Determinate sentencing does not reduce the odds against recidivism. Therefore, release success indicators, if there are any, must
be identified. By doing this, high risk releasees can be supervised
more closely with less tine and money spent monitoring low risk
groups.
PROPOSED ILLINOIS PAROLE PLAN

illinois should seriously consider a return to indeterminate sentencing within the offense classification scheme already in place.
Sentences should be in accord with the current range of punishment for a given offense. Since the existing classification scheme
generally is viewed as "tough on crime,"' 2 6 the political overtones
of a change to indeterminacy would be muted. A Class 1 offense
would still be punishable for a term of years of not less than four
nor more than fifteen.m2' The trial court, under this proposal,
would fix the sentence at a specific number of years, consistent with
the offense classification guidelines.
However, once the inmate served the statutory minimum for
the class offense (four years in the case of a Class 1 offender), he
would be eligible for parole. By retaining the fixed ranges for each
class of offense, much of the arbitrariness of prior indeterminate
sentencing would be eliminated. At the same time, the Board
123. R. GOLDFARB AND L. SINGER, AFTER CoNvICION 146-150 (1973).

124. Id. at 148.
125. Cf. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, THE ORGANIZATION AND
EFFEcTivENESS OF CORRECTIONAL AGENCIES 696-698 (1966); TAPPAN, CRIME,

JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 556 (1960) (citing SEIGLER, PRE-SENTENCE AND PREPAROLE INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL PROBATION ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 155

(1946)).
126. Aspen, supra note 89, at 34445.
127. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(4) (1990).
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would have a mechanism by which it could (a) release inmates who
demonstrate an ability to return to free society based on the Board's
evaluation of parole success indicators; (b) alleviate overcrowding
problems as needed; and (c) encourage inmate compliance with
prison rules by holding out hope of an early release.
This modest proposal would result in millions of dollars saved
annually. Approximately 11,000 inmates are serving sentences for
Class 2 through Class 4 felomes. 128 A ten percent parole rate for
this group would result in eleven hundred releases annually. A five
percent parole rate for Class 1 felons adds another two hundred to
the number of early releases, and a two and one half percent parole
rate for the more serious Class X classification adds another two
hundred early releases.is 9 Thus, without paroling any murder sentence inmates, the Department of Corrections would release approximately fifteen hundred inmates under this hypothetical
30
model.1
A fifteen hundred person reduction of the Illinois prison population saves millions of tax dollars, even if the inmate is subject to
electromc monitoring upon release. The difference in cost between
incarceration and electronic monitoring is roughly $9500 per inmate
per year, for a net annual savings of over fourteen million dollars. 131 Releasing the same fifteen hundred inmates without any
supervision saves taxpayers more than twenty-four million dollars
128. STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1990, supra note 1, at 5 (Table 1; based on
1990 figures).
129. Id. (this report shows a total inmate population for Class 1 felonies of
4008 and for Class X felomes of 8398).
130. The authors do not suggest that the release decision should be based on
a specific percentage of the prison population. The Board, or some other body,
should determine parole success predictors and apply them in determining
which inmates to release. See supratext accompanying notes 62-71. If there are
no identifiable predictors, then release should be predicated on other valid considerations. See supra and -rnfratext accompanying notes 123-33. The stated
percentages are chosen merely to demonstrate the cost savings.
The modesty of this proposal is evident when compared to the parole rate
in 1978, the first year of determinate sentencing. In 1978 there were 10,982
adult inmates in Illinois prisons. STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1990, supra note
1, at 2. The Board considered 6684 of these inmates for parole. STATE OF ILLINOIS, ANNuAL REPORT - 1ST YEAR OF PRISONER REVIEW BOARD

20 (1979). The

Board granted 3823 of these parole requests, or approximately 35% of the total
prison population. I&L By comparion, the authors' proposal would release
some 1500 of the 28,800 inmates, or approximately 5% of the total prison population. This modest plan would not only ease Illinois' prison overcrowding and
fiscal difficulties, but would also be consistent with the State's offense classification guidelines.
131. The Department of Corrections places the annual cost of incarceration
at $16,176 per inmate and the cost of electronic monitoring at $6600 per person.
TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 25. Since field supervision is a "bad joke,"
see Recktenwald & Karwath, ParoleSystem a Bad Joke that May Get Worse,
Chicago Tribune, Apr. 7, 1991, at 1, col. 5, paid for by taxpayers, a strong case
can be made for release with no supervision.
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annually. This proposal, or some similar plan which restores to the
Board the ability to release determinate sentence inmates, is
needed now to alleviate the prison overcrowding crisis as well as
132
Illinois' fiscal difficulties.

PAROLE SUPERVISION
Parole terms vary in length. Under determinate sentencing,
those convicted of murder or a Class X felony will serve three years
on parole; for Class 1 and Class 2 convictions two years; and for

Class 3 and Class 4 felonies, one year. 3 3 Prisoners who were sentenced before the advent of determinate sentencing (1978) are subject to varying periods of parole. For these prisoners, parole terms
can last from the date of release on parole to the expiration of the
maximum term of the sentence. 134 A prisoner, for example, sentenced to 10-20 years and released on parole after 7 years can be
held on parole for 13 years. 13 5
Illinois parolees and mandatory supervised releasees are governed by an elaborate and exhaustive set of rules. 136 Two conditions are mandatory: (1) they must not violate any criminal laws;
and (2) they may not possess a firearm or other dangerous
weapon. 13 7 In addition to these mandatory conditions, the Board
may impose special conditions. Parolees and releasees may be required to work, or to pursue a course of study or vocational train132. There are a number of alternative parole plans wlch would introduce a
measure of mdetermnacy to the present determinate sentencing scheme while
permitting the Board to alleviate the prison overcrowding crisis. One such plan,
formerly used by the federal system, is to make inmates eligible for parole after
completing one third of their determinate sentence. See 18'U.S.C. § 4205(a)
(1987). Under this system, the sentencing judge also had the option of permitting parole at some time prior to the one-third date. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205(b), (c)
(1987). Under the former federal plan, the one-third date was determined by an
inmate's actual time served, excluding good time credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a)

(1987).
In creating an appropriate Illinois parole plan, legislators might consider
alternatives which combine this article's proposal with the former federal
scheme. An example of such a hybrid plan is to permit parole eligibility upon
an inmate's completion of one-half (or two-thirds) of his determinate sentence
including good time credits. This plan would have the same advantage of this
article's proposal, that is, to tie an inmate's institutional behavior to his parole
'eligibility date. In addition, it would delay the eligibility date of the inmate
sentenced at the high end of an offense classification. This proposal would
more closely correlate the eligibility date to the actual determinate sentence
imposed by the trial judge.
133. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(d) (1990).
134. Faheem-E1 v. Klincar, 123 Ill. 2d 291, 527 N.E.2d 307 (1988).
135. See ?d. at 295-97, 527 N.E.2d at 311; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1003-3-9(i)(A) (1975).
136. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-7 (1990). 137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-7 (1990).
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mg.138 They may be ordered to undergo medical or psychiatric
treatment or treatment for drug addiction or alcoholism. 139 They
can be told where to live and with whom.' 4° They can be directed to
support their dependents, report to their parole agent, or allow
their agent to visitfthem in their homes. 14 1
Parolees can be told not to associate with other parolees or exconvicts, not to write to inmates, and not to leave a designated
county. 1' They may need permission from their parole agent to
drink alcohol, own a car, change jobs or residences, or to get married.143 The Board's power to regulate their life is probably limited
only by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and any restriction which arguably advances a legitimate penological or rehabilitational goal is likely to be upheld.'4
The actual supervision of parolees and releasees, however, is
not one of the Board's duties. In fact, the agents who are assigned
to assist and supervise parolees and releasees are not employed by
the Board and are not accountable to it. 145 The agents work for the
Department of Corrections, not the Board, and their allegiance to
the Department sometimes puts them at odds with the Board.
Parole agents have a two-fold function: a) to assist the parolee
with his problems and help hun adjust to his new freedom; and b) to
protect the public from criminal behavior by the parolee.1' "Many
observers feel these two tasks of the parole agent are incompatible
and irreconcilable, that he cannot be at once a policeman and
caseworker."'14 7 While this tension deserves further study to determine which role, if either, should predominate, a bigger problem
must be faced first.
There are more than fourteen thousand parolees and releasees
148
in Illinois and only about one hundred and twenty parole agents.
In 1987, the average caseload was approximately one hundred and
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
(1985);
143.
144.

ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.

REV.STAT.
REV. STAT.
REV. STAT.
REV. STAT.

ch.
ch.
ch.
ch.

38,
38,
38,
38,

para. 1003-3-7(b)(1) (1990).
para. 1003-3-7(b)(2) (1990).
paras. 1003-3-7(b)(3),(4) (1990).
paras. 1003-3-7(b)(5),(7) (1990).

STATE OF ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS PRISONER REvIEw BOARD RULES 15-17
see generally ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-7(a) (1990).
PRISONER REviEw BOARD RULES, supra note 142, at 17.
Greenholtz v. Nebraska State Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); cf. Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).

145. ILLINoIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1988) (hereinafter "Fiscal Report").
146. Id. at 42; C. NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE, AND PARDONS 277 (2d ed. 1964).
147. LESTER, PAROLE TREATMENT AND SURVEILLANCE-WHICH SHOULD DOMINATE 53 (82nd Annual Congress of Corrections 1952).
148. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 28; see also ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, HUMAN SERVICES PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 1985-1987 60 (1988).
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fifty parolees per agent. "In FY 1988, the layoff of 60% of the parole
agents caused the average caseload to triple. It rose to 306 cases per
agent, with some urban-area agents supervising more than 400 parolees each."'149 The parolee population (parolees plus releasees)
has "grown by 61% in the last ten years,"'150 and the number of released inmates is expected to increase by another 5,000 within the
next two years. 151 Average caseloads are triple the American Correctional Association (ACA) standard. Without dramatic increases
m the number of parole agents, the case overloads could reach five
times the ACA standard by 1994.152
A study of federal parole officers, with substantially smaller
caseloads than Illinois parole officers, showed that parolees re153
ceived an average of seven minutes per week of supervision.
Only two to three minutes of this time constituted actual face-toface contact with the agent. The Georgia Department of Corrections concluded that its agents, with caseloads of one hundred parolees, spent, on the average, eight minutes per week with each
parolee.' 54
These studies cannot be superimposed on the Illinois system
because the agents' duties, though similar, are not identical to the
duties of Illinois agents. Also, it is possible that Illinois parole
agents are more efficient or work longer hours. It is just as possible, on the other hand, that parole agents in Illinois are less efficient or work fewer hours, in which case the figures would be even
worse. But at "these caseload levels, no effective supervision of pa155
rolees can take place."'

The efficacy of parole must be questioned, irrespective of
whether the proper role of the agent is that of caseworker or policeman. Neither of the agent's primary functions can be served if his
contact with the parolee amounts to less than an hour or two each
month. Moreover, some studies suggest that "parole is largely a
random process in terms of the impact of supervision on parole success."'156 In 1963, the State of Florida released more than one thou157
sand inmates as a result of the Gideon v. Wasnwrsght decision.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Fiscal Report, supra note 145, at 42.
TRANsrION PAPER, supra note 3, at 28.

Id
Id.

153. Singer & Wright, supra note 103, at 68 (citing UNITED STATEs FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, PROBATION TIME STUDY (1973)).
154. MEGATHALIN, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION,
PROBATION AND PAROLEE CASELOAD REVIEW (1973).

155. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 29.

156. Singer & Wright, supra note 103, at 69.
157. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Supreme Court held
that indigent defendants m non-capital criminal trials have the right to the
assistance of counsel. On remand, the Florida Supreme Court provided an ave-

The John Marshall Law Remew

[Vol. 24:815

None of these releasees were predetermined as acceptable risks for
release; they were released suddenly and arbitrarily by operation of
the Supreme Court decision. This group of "unplanned" releasees
was then compared with another group which consisted of inmates
released in accordance with normal release procedures in Flor-ida.'5 8 The research team tracked the recidivism rates of the two
groups and concluded that the rate of recadivism for the planned
release group was substantially higher than for the unplanned
releases. i5 9
Other studies show that parole supervision can make a difference with the right parolees.L60 Because Illinois does not track this
issue or record relevant data, it is impossible to decide whether parole supervision makes a difference. However, available data indicates that most recidivism occurs within the first nine months.' 6' If
the parolee makes it through the first year and has a job, then recidivism is far less likely to occur.i 62 These studies support a reduction
in the length of Illinois' parole and mandatory supervised release
terms; a one third reduction in the length would reduce the current
parolee population by 2300.163 By reducing the period of supervision, more time can be spent with parolees during the critical first
year and more time can be spent on the highest risks.
Since field supervision is far less expensive than incarceration,
there is much to be gained from incorporating new programs or
shifting already limited resources. For example, electronic momtoring enables parole agents to more effectively police a greater
number of parolees.' 64 Incorporated correctly, electronic monitoring would permit a smaller number of parole officers to monitor the
same number of releasees. Policymakers confront a dilemma with
any policy to ease prison overcrowding, since parole agents are already overloaded with cases. 165 Either more money must be spent
nue of post-conviction relief for the many who were demed their right to counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1963).
158. EICHMANN, supra note 75, at 71-73.
159. Id. An American Bar Association Project noted these findings could
support the conclusion that "if we, today, turned loose all of the inmates of our
prisons without regard to the length of their sentences and, with some exceptions without regard to their previous offenses we might reduce the recidivism
rate . " AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINiMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND

PROCEDURES 59 (approved draft 1968).
160. H. SACKS & C. LOGAN, DOES PAROLE MAKE A DIFFERENCE 24 (1979);

Martinson & Wilks, Save ParoleSuperunston, 41 Federal Probation 23 (1977).
161. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 29.

162. Glaser, supra note 77, at 9; Rogers, supra note 62, at 6.
163. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 29.
164. Id at 24-26.

165. Id.
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on prisons, the most costly alternative, or more money must be
spent on the release programs.
CONCLUSION

When it comes to correctional policies and criminal justice,
symbolic politics and unintended consequences are the norm. Today's reform was yesterday's disaster and may well appear again as
tomorrow's failure. 166 Illinois abandoned indeterminate sentencing
in the 1970's for the popular appeal of determinate sentencing and
its "tough on crime" posture. Indeterminate sentencing had failed
in its mission and was properly criticized for arbitrariness and inconsistency. 167 Moreover, determinate sentencing reduced randomness, at least within categories of offenses, and had great political
appeal. But the cost of determinate sentencing has been extremely
high.
It is long past time to realize that Illinois cannot build its way
out of current prison overcrowding problems. 168 However, releasmg inmates from prison is politically risky, as the Willie Horton
affair proved to Michael Dukakis. Political honesty and the financial bottom line dictate that this risk must be assumed. The vast
69
majority of Illinois' felony sentence inmates will be released.'
The only real question is when and under what circumstances release will occur.
To maximize the safety of citizens while reducing costs, or at
least holding them in check, Illinois must begin to correlate and
evaluate the data on successful transition from prison to field supervision or to unsupervised freedom. Whether Illinois retains its
determinate sentencing laws or returns to a measure of indeterminacy, there still must be a working knowledge of which factors, if
any, lead to an inmate's successful transition to free citizensip.
The starting point must be a determined and thorough review of
the existing relevant data so that release decisions are based on information rather than inspiration.
If there are identifiable predictors of successful transition,
these predictors must replace the current ad hoc approach to release decision-making. In the event a thorough search proves that
it is impossible to determine which factors predict a successful transition from prison to life in the free community, then release decisions should be based on other, equally valid, criteria. Controlling
inmate behavior within Illinois prisons is one such legitimate con166. Casper, supr note 13, at 233.
167. Frankle, supra note 90, at 7-8.
168. TRANSrrION PAPER, supra note 3, at 1.
169. TRANsrION PAPER, supra note 3, at 1.
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cern. Thus, a return to a measure of indeterminacy would aid
prison officials in their efforts to minimize the risk of violence to
guards and inmates alike.
Another legitimate use of a measure of indeterminacy is to control the overcrowding problem which has plagued Illinois for years
and threatens to worsen. By using some form of mdeterminate sentence system, Illinois can reduce the burgeoning and inevitable cost
to taxpayers resulting from the current determinate sentencing
laws. Without examining the relevant data, however, it is too early
to prescribe the exact contours of a return to indeterminate sentencmg. What is clear is that determinate sentencing is overloadmg Illinois prisons and imposing a substantial financial burden on
the state. Something must be done to alleviate this problem. A return to some measure of indeterminate sentencing, perhaps within
the range of sentence by class of offense as already established by
Illinois' determinate sentence law, is necessary. Under this approach, the arbitrariness of Illinois' prior indeterminate sentencing
law would be controlled by the limited range of sentences permitted under the current classification system. This approach is worth
additional research and consideration because the substantial monetary savings are indisputable.
Finally, Illinois must end the cruel hoax of release supervision.
There are too many releasees and too few supervisory agents for
meaningful supervision to occur. Using current figures, an Illinois
releasee is unlikely to spend more than a few hours a year with his
supervising agent. Given these limits, no agent can be expected to
monitor the releasee's conduct, provide employment counseling, or
assist the releasee in adjusting to life beyond the prison walls.
As a short term measure, Illinois should reduce the length of
release supervision terms to one year since most violations occur
within the first year. 17° In addition, Illinois should consider elimnating all field supervision or limiting this supervision to a small
fraction of the total number of releasees. The charade of supervision must be ended soon. The only way to end this charade is to
eliminate supervision or focus these efforts on a limited number of
releasees who are the most violent or the most likely to recidivate.
Illinois is already a grossly overstocked warehouse for prisoners, and this warehouse is a monstrous financial burden. By standmg pat, Illinois falls further behind. It is tune for Illinois to take
immediate action. Only by taking action, guided by information and
political honesty, can this problem be checked. And political honesty demands that policymakers gather and use the existing mfor170. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 29.
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mation to implement viable programs without succumbing to the
partisan political pressures surrounding this volatile issue.
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